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Protecting the environment, both living and non-living, is important. Mining, too, is important, as it 
provides the raw products for many of today’s “necessities,” including cobalt, nickel, and the rare earth 
metals used in electronics. Deep seabed mining (DSM) is an important and emerging field within the Law 
of the Sea as countries and companies expand their production of minerals. The International Seabed Area 
(The Area), which is the seabed and subsoil area beyond national jurisdictions, the subject for this type of 
mining, was deemed to be the “common heritage of mankind”
 
and outside the jurisdiction of any one 
State.
1
 This required separate governance structured under Part XI of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
2
  
This article will focus on liabilities for the Area and examine the question of liability for the 
various actors involved, including contractors/operators who carry out the exploitation of resources, 
sponsoring States, flag States, and the International Seabed Authority. It is necessary to analyze the 
current state of liability provisions, should environmental damage occur in the Area. The rapid pace of 
technological advancement and the unknown extent of environmental damage make a fulsome liability 
regime necessary. Unfortunately, as will be shown in this article, there are still extensive unknowns in the 
legal landscape.  
This article will investigate two areas of liability: the standard of liability (strict, negligence, and 
whether there is a potential for a due diligence defense, active act, or mens rea requirements) and the 
extent of liability (limited or unlimited damage claim potentials). The UNCLOS seems to provide for one 
type of liability for operators, but the subsequent legislation, as will be shown, seems to “water down” 
liabilities, making a detailed analysis required. 
Given the scope of this article, not all areas of liability can be addressed. There are many other 
areas of liability that need to be assessed in subsequent research, including procedural claims, the types of 
due diligence defenses, and whether environmental impact assessments and plans of work would fulfill 
these requirements, the assessment of damages and the ability to pay, and the creation of DSM insurance 
to handle any liability claims.  
This article will be structured as follows. Part 1 will detail the history and context of DSM. Part 2 
is subdivided into two sections: the first subsection will detail the current UNCLOS and regulatory state 
of liability for DSM, while the second subsection will identify gaps in liabilities both from the historical 
context and from the current governance regime. Part 3 will investigate the domestic legislation of several 
countries to determine if any gaps are filled by domestic laws, as required by the UNCLOS.
3
 Part 4 will 
research other maritime liability regimes, including civil liability regimes, to attempt to show how a 
system could be developed to deal with all aspects of liabilities. Part 5 will synthesize the current research 
                                                 
†
 This article was the winning entry in the 2018 Ocean Yearbook  Student Paper Competition. 
1
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 United Nations Treaty Series 397, entered 
into force on Nov. 1, 1994, Article 136; See also M. Lodge, “The common heritage of mankind,” The International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 27 (2012): 733–742. 
2
 Id., Part XI.  
3
 Given the parameters of this article, it is not possible to canvass every country with an interest in DSM in the Area. 
Thus, the countries of Singapore, Nauru, Tonga, China, Canada, the U.S.A., and New Zealand will be chosen. 
Follow-up research will investigate other countries with potential DSM claims, such as the EU, India, Russia, the 
U.K., and others.  
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and recommend changes to the development of liability standards, including the creation of an 
environmental fund.  
 
 
PART 1 – CONTEXT AND LIABILITY ISSUES 
 
The Deep Seabed (DSB) extends on the continental shelf, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and the 
Area, and is defined as any seabed surface below 200 m.
4
 It is thought to contain vast quantities of 
minerals, resources, and potentially oil and gas.
5
 The DSB encompasses not only the Area, but also the 
continental shelf (CS) and EEZ.
6
 Resources are defined in Article 133 of the UNCLOS as “all solid, 
liquid or gaseous mineral resources in situ in the Area at or beneath the seabed, including polymetallic 
nodules.”
7
 It is believed to be a next frontier for extractive industries,
8
 as it is seen as solving two issues: 
first, the potential decline in on-shore mineral resources, such as copper and rare-earth metals,
9
 and 




DSM has not been a significant issue to date due to a lack of technologies that could exploit the 
Area.
11
 However, extractive technologies are advancing at a rapid pace and are almost at commercial 
readiness.
12
 Given that much of the DSB is found at depths of 1.5 km and commercial quantities from 
3000 to 6,000 m,
13
 there is a great risk of environmental damage conducted by any exploration or 
exploitation.  
There was no fulsome regulatory regime for the Area in the UNCLOS. Rather, Part XI created the 
International Seabed Authority (ISA) to regulate activities.
14
 The ISA may exercise control in the Area, as 
is necessary, to ensure compliance with Part XI, and all countries are obligated to ensure compliance with 
Article 139.
15
 The ISA is thus responsible for all DSM in the Area.
16
 To obtain a permit to explore the 
Area for DSM, a sponsoring state must submit a Plan of Work.
17
 As of the date of this article, twenty 
eight exploration contracts have been issued by the ISA.
18
 Yet, despite this number of permits, there are 
several important legal issues related to DSM that have not been fully developed, including both liability 
and environmental assessment (EA) requirements.  
                                                 
4
 M. Lodge, “The International Seabed Authority and deep seabed mining,” UN Chronicle 54:2 (2017): 44–46. 
5
 A. Jaeckel, J. Ardron and K. Gjerde, “Sharing benefits of the common heritage of mankind: Is the deep seabed 
mining regime ready?,” Marine Policy 70 (2016): 198–204. 
6
 UNCLOS provides that the CS and EEZ are within national jurisdiction of States and thus outside the scope of this 
research. 
7
 UNCLOS, n. 1 above, Article 133. 
8
 International Seabed Authority, “Towards the Development of a Regulatory Framework for Polymetallic Nodule 
Exploitation in the Area, Technical Study No. 11 (Jamaica: ISA, 2013).  
9
 R.E. Kim, “Should deep seabed mining be allowed?” Marine Policy 82 (2017): 134–137, p. 135. 
10
 L.D. Bolong, “Into the abyss: Rationalizing commercial deep seabed mining through pragmatism and 
international law,” Tulane Law Review 26 (2016): 128–180, p. 132. 
11
 R.E. Boschen et al., “Mining of deep-sea seafloor massive sulfides: A review of the deposits, their benthic 
communities, impacts from mining, regulatory frameworks and management strategies ,” Ocean & Coastal 
Management 84 (2013): 54–67, p. 55. 
12
 Id., p. 56. 
13
 International Seabed Authority, Proposed Technologies for Mining Deep-seabed Polymetallic Nodules, 
Proceedings of the ISA’s Workshop held in Kingston, Jamaica, (3–6 August 1999) ISA/2001/07 at 34. 
14
 UNCLOS, Part XI, Section 4, Article 156.  
15
 Id., Article 153(4).  
16
 Id., Article 157. 
17
 D.K. Anton, R.A. Makgill and C.R. Payne, “ITLOS / Case No. 17, Seabed Mining – Advisory Opinion on 
Responsibility and Liability,” Environmental Policy and Law 41, no. 2 (2011): 60-65 
18
 ISA, Deep Seabed Minerals Contractors, (2018), available online: <https://www.isa.org.jm/deep-seabed-minerals-
contractors>. 
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In 2009, the small island state of Nauru asked the ISA to seek an Advisory Opinion, as mandated 
under Article 191 of UNCLOS, to clarify the liability of sponsoring states.
19
 On February 1, 2011, the 
Seabed Disputes Chamber (SDC) released its Advisory Opinion on State Liability (Case 17).
20
 This 
Advisory Opinion is important in several respects, in that it illustrates a number of concepts, principles, 
and norms, it advances jurisprudence, and it was the first time that NGOs took part in proceedings of the 
Chamber.
21
 Deepening potential environmental hazards is the issue that State parties are not the only 
potential sources of environmental damage, as many States do not have the technical nor financial 
capabilities to undertake DSM.
22
 For example, Nauru admitted that  
 
recognizing this, Nauru’s sponsorship of Nauru Ocean Resources Inc. was originally premised 
on the assumption that Nauru could effectively mitigate (with a high degree of certainty) the 
potential liabilities or costs arising from its sponsorship. This was important, as these liabilities 
or costs could, in some responsibilities and obligations of states with respect to 17 activities in 
the area (advisory opinion of 1 February 2011) circumstances, far exceed the financial 
capacities of Nauru (as well as those of many other developing States). Unlike terrestrial 
mining, in which a State generally only risks losing that which it already has (for example, its 
natural environment), if a developing State can be held liable for activities in the Area, the State 




Case 17 also clarified certain jurisdictional issues. It clarified that the jurisdiction of the ISA only relates 
to the exploration and exploitation of minerals from the seabed and lifting them to the surface.
24
 It does 
not include processing on land or transportation from the high seas superjacent to the Area.
25
 This has 
impacts on liability and insurability, in that damage occurring in the Area is regulated by the ISA, but as 
soon as a vessel crossed into another marine area, then other UNCLOS provisions apply.
26
 As will be 
discussed, this poses liability issues with DSM and potentially necessitates a harmonious relationship 
with EEZ and territorial water provisions, whether or not these provisions provide adequate 
environmental protections.  
 The UNCLOS is vague on the liability standard for States. Case 17 analyzed the “duty to ensure” 
obligation (i.e., the due diligence obligation) not to cause environmental harm.
27
 The SDC deemed that 
this due diligence defense obligation is not one of result but of conduct.
28
 It also then implied that this 
standard would place limits on States’ liability,
29
 and the obligation would be met if a State employed, on 
                                                 
19
 Anton et al., n. 17 above, p. 61.  
20
 Responsibilities and obligations of States sponsoring persons and entities with respect to activities in the Area  
(Request for Advisory Opinion submitted to the Seabed Disputes Chamber) (ITLOS Case No. 17) (1 February 2011) 
ITLOS Reports 2011.  The SBC was created under UNCLOS, Part XI, s. 5 and Annex VI. 
21
 A. Dolidze, “Advisory opinion on responsibility and liability for international seabed mining (ITLOS Case 17) 
and the future of NGO participation in the international legal process,” ILSA Journal of International & 
Comparative Law 19, no. 2 (2013): 379–418. 
22
 T. Poisel, “Deep seabed mining: Implications of seabed disputes chamber’s advisory opinion,” Australian 
International law Journal 19 (2012): 213–233, p. 215. 
23
 Case 17, n. 20 above, para 4. 
24
 Id., paras. 94 and 95. 
25
 Id., para. 96; see also Anton et al, n. 17 above, p. 62. 
26
 Y. Tanaka, “Obligations and liability of sponsoring states concerning activities in the Area : Reflections on the 
ITLOS advisory opinion of 1 February 2011,” Netherlands International Law Review 60, no 2 (2013): 205–230, p. 
209. 
27
 UNCLOS, Article 139(1). See also Case 17, n. 20 above, para. 108. 
28
 I. Plakokefalos , “Seabed disputes chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea responsibilities and 
obligations of states sponsoring persons and entities with respect to activities in the Area,” Journal of Environmental 
Law 24, no. 1 (2011): 133–143, p. 136. 
29
 Id., p. 247. 
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a best-efforts basis, a contractor’s compliance.
30
 It also specifically ruled out the application of strict 
liability against the State.
31
  
Question 2 of Case 17 stated: “What is the extent of liability of a State Party for any failure to 
comply with the provisions of the Convention, in particular Part XI, and the 1994 Agreement, by an entity 
that it has sponsored under Article 153, paragraph 2(b), of the Convention?”
32
 The SDC stated: “In 
Question 2, the English term “liability” refers to the consequences of a breach of the sponsoring State’s 
obligations.”
33
 Anton notes that it is customary in international law to first look at the private contractor 
for compensation of harm caused by a wrongful act, even if attributed to the State.
34
 It is only if total 
compensation is not achieved that residual liability to the State might be applied.
35
 There is thus a major 
gap, should serious environmental damage take place. Moreover, the court did not address several major 
issues, as will be discussed later. Specifically, the court noted, “Considering that the potential for damage, 
particularly to the marine environment, may increase during the exploitation phase, it is to be expected 
that member States of the Authority will further deal with the issue of liability in future regulations on 
exploitation. The Chamber would like to emphasize that it does not consider itself to be called upon to lay 
down such future rules on liability.”
36
 
 Substantial developments have taken place since Case 17 was released. Two main developments 
that require the speedier development of liability regulations include new scientific discoveries and the 
rapid development of technologies which are making commercial exploitation of the Area feasible. 
Scientific uncertainty in the Area and the need to apply the Precautionary Approach to DSM cannot be 
overstated. For example, in 2015, a group of researchers from the University of Rhode Island discovered 
large numbers of egg cases adjacent to hydrothermal vents off the coast of the Galapagos Islands.
37
 This 
was the first case of this type of behaviour among a marine animal recovered. These vents are the same 
vents thought to hold massive amounts of mineral deposits, and are soon to be explored in the DSB, 
providing evidence that exploration of the Area’s DSB could have a material impact on the marine living 
environment.
38
 As will be discussed, the types of mining will vary according to the type of mineral in the 
Area. As such, a range of differing toxic metal mixtures may be released into the sea. This has been 
shown to disrupt an organism’s cell structure, at least in the territorial waters area.
39
 Scientists do not yet 
know if the effects on land or shallow waters apply to the DSB, and many urge the use of the “weight of 
evidence approach” and a more scientifically based environmental assessment process, as there are still 
too many unknowns as it relates to the DSB.
40
 These are just two small examples of the scientific 
uncertainty surrounding the Area, should environmental damage occur.  
However, time is running out for this weight of evidence approach to be more fully developed, as 
there are now technologies available that can mine at depths below 1.5 km. The first commercial 
                                                 
30
 Case 17, n. 20 above, para. 110. 
31
 Id., para. 189. 
32
 Id., para. 164. 
33
 Id., para. 70. 
34
 D.K. Anton, “The principle of residual liability in the seabed disputes chamber of the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea: The advisory opinion on responsibility and liability for international seabed mining  (ITLOS 
Case No. 17),” McGill International Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy  7, (2012): 241–257, p. 
249; see also G. Doeker and T. Gehring, “Private or international liability for transnational environmental damage: 
The precedent of conventional liability regimes,” Journal of Environmental Law 2, no. 1 (1990): 1–16 and 
International Law Commission, n. 8 above, paras. 340–386. 
35
 Id., p. 247. 
36
 Case 17, n 20 above, para. 168. 
37
 P. Salinas-de-León et al., “Deep-sea hydrothermal vents as natural egg-case incubators at the Galapagos Rift,” 
Scientific Reports, 8:1788 (2018): 1–7, available online: <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-018-20046-4> 
38
 Id., p. 5. 
39
 C. Hauton et al., “Identifying toxic impacts of metals potentially released du ring deep sea mining: A synthesis of 
the challenges and quantifying risk,” Frontiers of Marine Science 4:368 (2017): 1–13, p. 9. 
40
 Id., p. 12. 
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operation of DSM will take place off the coast of Papua New Guinea (“PNG”) in 2019, if financial 
hurdles are overcome.
41
 At approximately 35 km from PNG, and sitting at a depth of 1,600 m, the 
Solwara 1 project will use innovative mining techniques to extract copper, with some gold deposits 
having potential commercial significance.
42
 Although the project will take place in the EEZ of PNG, the 
depth of the drilling and type of extraction shows similarities to other DSM in the Area. Additionally, as 
will be described below, PNG has partnered with Nautilus Minerals Inc. (Nautilus), a Canadian company 
listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange,
43
 to be the Contractor.
44
 As is the case with Tonga and Nauru in 
the Area, PNG does not have the financial, or the technical resources, to conduct DSM on its own.
45
 
Nautilus does not own the vessel, but has chartered the vessel from Dubai-based Marine Assets 
Corporation.
46
 This highlights a fourth party that could have liability – that is the “flag State” vessel.
47
 
Solwara 1 is also important as Nautilus also owns a valued license in the Clarion Clipperton Zone 
(CCZ).
48
 The results of Solwara 1 and any environmental damage from the mining may have a profound 
influence on the development of extraction in the Area.
49
 The type and quantum of damage in the EEZ, 
and the resulting liabilities to the parties would provide meaningful data applicable to the Area.
50
 Further 
research is required.   
In 2011, Tonga Offshore Mining Limited (TOML), a sponsored company of the Tonga 
government, but owned by Nautilus Minerals, was granted approximately 75,000 sq. km in the highly 
prospective CCZ.
51
 The CCZ has been identified by the ISA as a zone of particular importance, especially 
                                                 
41
 Mining Watch Canada, “Nautilus AGM: Solwara 1 Deep Sea Mining Venture Remains a Speculative Pipe 
Dream,” Press Release (28 June 2017), available online: <https://miningwatch.ca/news/2017/6/28/nautilus -agm-
solwara-1-deep-sea-mining-venture-remains-speculative-pipe-dream>. See also, Deep Sea Mining Campaign, 
Former Attorney General of Papua New Guinea: The writing is on the wall for Solwara 1 – PNG should withdraw 
its investment before it’s too late (17 January 2018), Media Release. However, according to its own disclosures, a 
Q3 2019 is still targeted. See Nautilus Minerals Inc., Material Change Report 51-102F1 (28 February 2018) 
accessed via SEDAR. 
42
 K. Gena, “Deep sea mining of submarine hydrothermal deposits and its possible environmental impact in Manus 
Basin, Papua New Guinea,” Procedia Earth and Planetary Science 6 (2013): 226–233, p. 230. 
43
 Nautilus Minerals is a Canadian mining company listed on the TSX, ticker symbol “NUS.” Having only a market 
capitalization of approximately CA$127 million and a negative revenue stream at the time of writing, there is a real 
risk of the project having serious financial issues, which would indicate that any environmental damage would have 
serious financial repercussions. For a video depicting the vessel to be used and the mining techniques employed, see 
<http://www.nautilusminerals.com/irm/content/video-gallery.aspx?RID=421>. 
44
 “Nautilus Minerals Receives World’s First Deep-Sea Mining Lease for Solwara 1,” Sea Technology 52:3 (2011): 
49. 
45
 H. Rosenbaum, Out of our depth: Mining the ocean floor in Papua New Guinea . (online: Mining Watch Canada, 
2011). available online: http://www.deepseaminingoutofourdepth.org/wp-content/uploads/Out-Of-Our-Depth-low-
res.pdf 
46
 M. Schuler, “First Deep Sea Mining Production Vessel Launched in China ,” (30 March 2018) Press Release, 
available online: <http://gcaptain.com/first-deep-sea-mining-production-vessel-launched-in-china/>. 
47
 The Flag State of this vessel is still unclear. This vessel was built in China by Fujian Mawei shipbuilding, and the 
basic design for the seabed mining vessel is provided by SeaTech Solutions International, a marine designs specialist 
based in Singapore. The takeaway is the number of parties involved and issues of liability (which design flaw, 
construction problem, or maintenance issue) are all to be determined. There are still many financial issues with this 
project. See Material Change Report, BCSC Form 51-102F3, Nautilus Minerals Inc., (18 December 2017).  
48
 As a TSX-listed issuer, NUS is mandated to provide securities laws disclosures. See Technical Report, TOML 
Clarion Clipperton Zone Project, Pacific Ocean), (27 February 2018), made pursuant to Standards of Disclosure for 
Mineral Projects, BCSC NI 43-101 (9 May 2016).  
49




 Technical Report, n. 48 above.  
51
 P. Taumoepeau, “Re: Developing a Regulatory Framework for Mineral Exploitation in the Area – Report to 
Members of the Authority and all Stakeholders,” Letter to ISA from Tonga Offshore Mining Limited, (25 May 2015) 
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from an environmental perspective.
52
 From a DSM perspective, the CCZ is an area particularly rich in 
polymetallic nodules.
53
 From an environmental perspective, it is also of significance. As such, in July, 
2012, the ISA adopted an Environmental Management Plan for the CCZ.
54
 This Plan has a provision for 
an EA but no additional liability provisions.
55
 Given the decision in Case 17, that due diligence standards 
may differ depending on the type of mining, it is imperative to have higher standards for environmental 
liabilities in the CCZ. 
 
  
PART 2 – CURRENT STATE OF EA AND MINING REGULATION IN THE AREA 
 
Given the historical context discussed above, it is necessary to investigate the current state of regulation 
in the Area. Article 145 of the UNCLOS contains basic environmental protection requirements, stating 
that the ISA shall adopt rules regulations and procedures for the prevention, reduction, and control of 
pollution and other hazards to the marine environment, including the ecological balance and the 
protection of flora and fauna.
56
 Article 139 of the UNCLOS sets out basic liability requirements for the 
Area.
57
 Article 139(2) notes that damage caused by the failure of a State Party or international 
organization to carry out its responsibilities “shall entail liability” [emphasis added].
58
 This liability is 
joint and several between the State and the Contractor. However, a State is not liable for damage caused 
by any failure of the Contractor to comply if the State has taken “all necessary and appropriate 
measures” [emphasis added] to secure effective compliance under Article 153(4), and Annex III(4)(4).
59
 
This carve-out provision is contained in Annex III, Article 4(4), stating that the Sponsoring State shall 
ensure that the Contractor shall carry out its activities according to the contract and the UNCLOS. 
However, the Sponsoring State is not [emphasis added] liable due to damage caused by any failure of a 
contractor, sponsored by the State, to comply with its obligations if that State Party has adopted laws and 
regulations and taken administrative measures which are, within the framework of its legal system, 
reasonably appropriate for securing compliance by persons under its jurisdiction.
60
 Article 209 requires 
States to adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce, and control pollution coming from activities in the 
Area – laws which shall be no less effective than the international rules.
61
 Furthermore, section 235 
necessitates domestic legislation for compensation or other relief of damage caused by pollution of the 
marine environment.
62
 Finally, Annex III, Article 22, states that the contractor shall have liability arising 
out of wrongful acts [emphasis added] in the conduct of its operations.
63
 The ISA itself can be liable 
under the same provision, in that the ISA shall be liable for any damage arising out of wrongful acts in the 
exercise of its powers and functions.
64
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Jamaica: ISA, available online: <https://www.isa.org.jm/sites/default/files/toml_0.pdf>. See also ISA contract, (11 
January 2012) between TOML and ISA.  
52
 ISA, Legal and Technical Commission, Rationale, and recommendations for the establishment of preservation 
reference areas for nodule mining in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone ISBA/14/LTC/2* (28 March 2008). 
53
 ISA, A geological model of polymetallic nodule deposits in the Clarion-Clipperton fracture zone (ISA Technical 
Study no. 6) (Kingston, Jamaica: International Seabed Authority, 2010). 
54
 ISA, Decision of the Council relating to an environmental management plan for the Clarion -Clipperton Zone, 
ISBA/18/C/22 (26 July 2012).  
55
 ISA, Environmental Management Plan for the Clarion-Clipperton Zone, ISBA/17/ LTC/7 (13 July, 2011). 
56
 UNCLOS, n. 1 above, Article 145. 
57
 Id., Article 139. 
58
 Id., Article 139(2) 
59
 Id., Article 139(2). 
60
 1994 Agreement, Annex III, Article 4, para. 4. 
61
 UNCLOS, n. 1 above, Article 209(2) this is the basis of flag State liability.  
62
 Id., Article 235(2).  
63
 Id., Annex III, Article 22. 
64
 Id. 
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The language used in the UNCLOS seems to be conflicting. In Article 139(2), the sponsoring 
state escapes liability only if “all necessary and appropriate measures” have been taken.
65
 Yet, Annex III 
merely requires adoption of laws that are “reasonably appropriate for securing compliance.”
66
 Even in the 
UNCLOS, there is a weakening of liability for Sponsoring States. However, Case 17 did not address all 
issues of liability. To this end, the ISA has developed regulations that are the primary means by which the 
ISA develops procedures and rules around all aspects of DSM.
67
 Relevant to this article are the Mining 
Code, article 165(5) recommendations, and the Draft Regulations. 
The Mining Code is the collection of the regulations adopted by the ISA.
68
 The ISA, to date, has 
recommended and adopted three sets of regulations dealing with DSM. They are: Regulations on 
Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area (Nodules Regs);
69
 Regulations on 
Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Sulphides in the Area (Sulphides Regs);
70
 and Regulations 
on Prospecting and Exploration for Cobalt-rich Ferromanganese Crusts in the Area (Cobalt Crusts 
Regs).
71
 These regulations are designed to apply to the exploration and prospecting of the Area, and 
directly apply to exploitation of Resources.
72
 As noted in Case 17, there may be a different due diligence 
requirement for each of the types of mining,
73
 yet the drafting of each of the regulations is similar. Thus, 
there may be a gap between the decision of Case 17 and the regulatory standards required under the Code.  
Throughout the Mining Code, the protection of the environment is noted as important.
74
 In the 
Nodules Regs, Regulation 2 states that Prospectors and the Authority shall use the Precautionary 
Approach.
75
 Regulation 2(3) of the Cobalt Crusts Regs states that prospecting shall not be undertaken if 
substantial evidence indicates the risk of serious harm to the marine environment.
76
 It is worth noting that 
while the Sulphides Regs provide the obligation to apply “best environmental practices” for the 
sponsoring State, there is no similar reference in the earlier Nodules Regs.
77
 Regulation 30 of the Nodules 
Regs states that responsibility and liability of the contractor and of the authority shall be in accordance 
                                                 
65
 Id. Article 139(2) 
66
 Id., Annex III 
67
 A. Jaeckel, “Deep sea bed mining and adap tive management: The procedural challenges for the International 
Seabed Authority,” Marine Policy 70 (2016): 205–211, p. 207. 
68
 ISA, Mining Code, available online: <https://www.isa.org.jm/mining-code>. The Mining Code of the ISA is the 
set of rules regulations and procedures issued by the ISA to regulate the prospecting exploration and exploitation of 
marine minerals in the Area.  
69
 ISA, Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area, ISBA/6/A/18 (13 July 
2000), amended by ISBA/ 19/A/9; ISBA/19/A/12 (25 July 2013) and ISBA/20/A/9 (24 July 2014). Nodules include 
manganese, cobalt, copper, and nickel. 
70
 ISA, Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Sulphides in the Area, ISBA/16/A/12/Rev.1 
(15 November 2010), amended by ISBA/19/A/12 (25 July 2013) and ISBA/20/A/10 (24 July 2014). Polymetallic 
sulphides means hydrothermally formed deposits of sulphides and accompanying mineral resources in the Area 
which contain concentrations of metals including, inter alia, copper, lead, zinc, gold and silver. 
71
 ISA, Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Cobalt -rich Ferromanganese Crusts in the Area, 
ISBA/18/A/11 (27 July 2012), amended by ISBA/19/A/12 (25 July 2013). The definition of cobalt-rich 
ferromanganese crusts includes: cobalt-rich iron/manganese (ferromanganese) hydroxide/oxide deposits formed 
from direct precipitation of minerals from seawater onto hard substrates containing minor but significant 
concentrations of cobalt, titanium, nickel, platinum, molybdenum, tellurium, cerium, other metallic and rare earth 
elements.  
72
 Id., Preamble. 
73
 Case 17, n. 20 above, para. 136 for best environmental practices, para. 142 for EA and due diligence, para. 154 for 
developing States and due diligence and para. 242, the ruling.  
74
 E. Van Doorn, “Environmental aspects of the mining code: Preserving humankind’s common heritage while 
opening Pardo’s box?,” Marine Policy 70 (2016): 192–197, p. 195. 
75
 Nodules Regs, n. 69 above, Regulation 2. 
76
 Cobalt Crusts Regs ., n. 71 above, s. 2(3). 
77
 J. Gao, “The responsibilities and obligations of the sponsoring states advisory opinion,” Chinese Journal of 
International Law 12 (2013): 771–786, p. 775. 





  The contractor shall continue to have responsibility for any damage arising out of 
“wrongful acts in the conduct of its operations” [emphasis added], in particular damage to the marine 
environment, after the completion of the exploration phase.
79
 The key section here is “damage arising out 
of wrongful acts in the conduct of its operations.”
80
 This would seem to preclude any strict liability, and 
even the due diligence threshold may not be applicable. Yet there is no guidance on how this could be 
interpreted.  
Given an estimated minimum USD 1 billion capital cost to develop a nodule processing plant,
81
 
and the potential for these minerals to be used in a long-term strategic procurement initiative,
82
 the lack of 
more stringent liability provisions is problematic. Some of the issues are thought to be dealt with via 
contract law.
83
 For example, the Cobalt Crusts Regs Annex IV Standard clauses for exploration contract 
provides for liability in contractual terms.
84
  
 Complementing the Mining Code are the Recommendations. Under Article 165(2) of the 
UNCLOS, the ISA Legal and Technical Commission may make recommendations on the protection of 
the marine environment.
85
 On March 1, 2013, the LTC released its recommendations for the guidance of 
contractors for the assessment of the possible environmental impacts arising from exploration for marine 
minerals in the Area (“Recommendations”).
86
 Under the guise of the Precautionary Approach, the 
Recommendations state that every plan of work for exploration for marine minerals shall take into 
consideration the following phases of environmental studies: (a) Environmental baseline studies; (b) 
Monitoring to ensure that no serious harm is caused to the marine environment from activities during 
prospecting and exploration; and (c) Monitoring during and after testing of collecting systems and 
equipment.
87
 Unfortunately, liability guidelines are silent in the recommendations.
88
 Moreover, these 
recommendations deal only with exploration and prospecting, not commercial activity where most of the 
environmental damage is thought to occur.  
On August 8, 2017, the ISA released its Draft Regulations on Exploitation of Mineral Resources 
in the Area, (Draft Regulations)
89
 with an explanatory note from the Secretariat on August 10, 2017.
90
 
                                                 
78
 Cobalt Crusts Regs, n. 66 above, s. 32.  
79




 E. Egede, “African states and participation in deep seabed mining: Problems and prospects,” The International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 24 (2009): 683–712, p. 685. Given the age of this article, it would be likely 
even more expensive to build. These costs cannot be ignored relative to developing nations and the ‘common 
heritage of mankind’ doctrine, as it will most likely entail large transnational corporations or large state owned 
enterprises that become the Contractors.  
82
 Id., p. 700. 
83
 For example, in the responses to the Draft Regulations, several countries argue that terms should be defined in the 
contracts section, not in the regulations.  
84
 Cobalt Crusts Regs, n. 71 above, Annex IV.  
85
 UNCLOS, Article 165(2). 
86
 ISA, Recommendations for the guidance of contractors for the assessment of the possible environmental impacts 
rising from exploration for marine minerals in the Area , International Seabed Authority ISBA/19/LTC/8 (1 March 
2013). 
87
 Id., para. 11. 
88
 The Legal and Technical Commission during their March and July 2018 meetings will begin to investigate 
guidelines to complement the Draft Regulations.  
89
 ISA, Draft Regulations on Exploitation of Mineral Resources in the Area, (8 August 2017) ISBA/23/LTC/CRP.3.  
90
 ISA, Draft regulations on exploitation of mineral resources in the Area , Note by the Secretariat, (10 August 2017) 
ISBA/23/C/12 Unfortunately, due diligence and other liability issues were mostly  ignored. For example, question 2, 
of the Note states: “Contract area: for areas within a contract area not identified as mining areas, what due diligence 
obligations should be placed on a contractor as regards continued exploration activities? Such obliga tions could 
include a programme of activities covering environmental, technical, economic studies or reporting obligations (that 
is, activities and undertakings similar to those under an exploration contract). Are the concepts and definitions of 
“contract area” and “mining area(s)” clearly presented in the draft regulations?”  
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The Draft Regulations contain a comprehensive set of environmental assessment provisions.
91
 These 
regulations, unfortunately, fall far short of implementing a full liability regime for environmental harms. 
The Draft Regulations contain provisions for the application process, environmental impact assessment, 
and Performance Guarantees.
92
 Annex V contains the Environmental Impact Statement Template.
93
  
The liability provisions are contained in Annex X, Section  8, which states: 
 
8.1 The Contractor shall be liable to the Authority for the actual amount of any damage, 
including damage to the Marine Environment, arising out of its wrongful acts or omissions, 
[emphasis added] and those of its employees, subcontractors, agents and all persons engaged in 
working or acting for them in the conduct of its operations under this Contract, including the 
costs of reasonable measures to prevent, limit, and ameliorate damage to the Marine 
Environment, account being taken of any contributory acts or omissions by the Authority or 
third parties. This clause survives the termination of the Contract and applies to all damage 
caused by the Contractor regardless of whether it is caused or arises before, during, or after the 




This is an important term in the contract, and seems to contradict Article 139 and Case 17. It provides that 
the liability is to the ISA, and not any one government, and survives the end of the Contract. It also 
provides for damages being the actual amount of damages, so it does not appear that damage claims will 
be limited. Also, as previously noted, the ISA is a party with potential liability over damage to the marine 
environment. Draft Regulation 8.2 provides for an indemnity to the ISA stating:  
 
8.2 The Contractor shall indemnify the Authority [emphasis added], its employees, 
subcontractors and agents against all claims and liabilities of any third party arising out of any 
wrongful acts or omissions of the Contractor and its employees, agents and subcontractors, and 





Of clear note, both Draft Regulation 8 and the Draft Contract only call for damages related to 
“wrongful acts or omissions”
96
 [emphasis added]. There are no strict liability or negligence provisions; as 
such, these regulations are incomplete. It is unclear about due diligence or mens rea requirements. It is 
also unclear whether other compensatory or punitive damage claims could be advanced, as it states 
“actual amount of damage.”
97
 It provides additional evidence that the ISA is a party and could potentially 
be liable for environmental harms. Unfortunately, this indemnification is vague on details.  
Annex X of the Draft Regulations contains the Standard Clauses for exploitation contract.
98
 Like 
most contracts, its focus is on the rights and titles to the minerals, and it is, unfortunately, very brief and 
vague on environmental liabilities.
99
 Under section 3.2(d), the contractor must file an environmental 
management and monitoring plan;
100
 and under section 3.3, the contractor shall carry out its obligations 
under this contract with “due diligence, efficiency, and economy, with due regard to the effect of its 
activities on the marine environment, and exercising reasonable regard for other activities in the marine 
                                                 
91
 See Annex I below for Draft Regulations relating to environmental protections  
92
 Draft Regulations, n. 89 above, Regulation 9.  
93
 Id., Annex V. 
94
 Id., Annex X – Section  8.1. 
95
 Id., Section 8.2. 
96
 Id., Section 8. 
97
 Id.  Section 8.3 
98
 Id., Annex I. 
99
 Some would argue that liability will be contractually based rather than regulatory based.  
100
 Draft Regulations, n. 89 above, s. 3.2(d). 





 Potentially, this plan of work and contractual obligations could satisfy the due diligence 
defense, if applicable.  
In January 2017, prior to the release of the initial Draft Regulations, the ISA released a working 
paper on environmental matters.
102
 The paper draws upon the experience from land-based mining and oil 
and gas regimes, the shipping industry, and deep-sea fishing activities.
103
 One clear recommendation is on 
the creation of the “Environmental Liability Trust Fund.”
104
 The initial draft of the Draft Regulations also 
contained a substantive provision for a financial guarantee or security that would assist in liability claims 
and would help offset the costs of environmental remediation.
105
 The published Draft Regulations have 
been watered down, creating instead a “Performance Guarantee” provision which is much less robust.
106
 
The published Draft Regulations do not mention any trust, technology, or environmental liability fund. 
Thus, the watered-down regulations either do not address gaps in liabilities or they create them.  
Stakeholder submissions to the Draft Regulations were released in January, 2018.
107
 Of note was 
Australia’s response, which will be detailed below.
108
 However, there is still much discussion and 
disagreement in the international community on the Draft Regulations, environmental protections, and the 
gaps in environmental liabilities. The ISA has stated its goal of having the Draft Regulations adopted by 
2020,
109
 so time is of the essence.  
On September 28 and 29, 2017, a legal working group convened to develop a work plan to carry 
out further research.
110
 After a review of current UNCLOS and domestic legislation, the working group 
noted several issues. These involved liability in context of “effective control” and the role of sponsoring 
states, key sources of risks, potential failure of sea-floor tools, including the production vessel itself, 
collisions, and the potential roles of environmental funds, bonds, and insurance.
111
 Arising out of the 
conference came six bundles of issues: the purpose and scope of the regime, channeling liability/effective 
control, actionable damage, procedures, standards of liability, and form of the regime.
112
 This article will 
address several of these issues.  
                                                 
101
 Id., s. 3.3. 
102
 ISA, Developing a Regulatory Framework for Mineral Exploitation in the Area: A Discussion Paper on the 
development and drafting of Regulations on Exploitation for Mineral Resources in the Area (Working Paper, 
Environmental Matters) (Jamaica: ISA, 2017). 
103
 Id., para. 4.2.  
104
 Id., s. II, Possible working structure for the “Environmental Regulations” Part XII Compensatory measures, 
Section 1. This provision also called for the creation of a Seabed Mining Sustainability Fund – Draft Regulation 69 
105
 Id., Draft Regulation 44 Provision for a Financial Guarantee or Security.  
106
 Draft Regulations , n. 89 above, Regulation 9. 
107
 ISA, Submissions to International Seabed Authority’s Draft Regulations on Exploitation of Mineral Resources in 
the Area, ISBA/23/C/12 ISBA/23/LTC/CRP.3 (10 January 2018) Stakeholder submissions on the draft regulations 




 Australia, Government of Australia’s  submission on the draft Regulations on Exploitation of Mineral Resources 
in the Area (20 December 2017) ISBA/23/C/12.  
109
 Pew Charitable Trusts, Summaries of Stakeholder Submissions on the ISA Draft Exploitation Regulations, 




 F.-K. Phillips, Conference Report, London, United Kingdom, September 2017, Legal Working Group on 
Liability for Environmental Harm from Activities in the Area, (Waterloo: Centre for International Governance 
Innovation, 2018) p. 2. 
111
 Id., p. 5. 
112
 Id., pp. 9–10. 
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From March 5 to 8, 2018, the ISA convened Part I the 24th Session of the ISA (the Session), with 
the goal of having the next round of draft regulations available in July, 2018.
113
 Day 1 of the Session 
outlined the purpose of the meeting, and, for purposes of this article, there are several important 
discussion points, including: the role of the sponsoring state, the role of legal status of standards and LTC 
guidelines, the broader environmental policy and regulations on exploitation, and the roles of the ISA.
114
 
The ISA noted that compliance of contractors was not a pressing issue due to the preliminary nature of the 
work, but now that prototyping and full operation is near, compliance will become important.
115
 Day 3 
featured consideration of the role of sponsoring states, the ISA and contractors, including questions of 
liability, and the role and legal status of standards, recommendations and guidelines.
116
 There are also 
discussions on the legally binding nature of the ISA rules and guidelines.
117
 
 Part 1 of the Session did not provide consensus to any gaps in liabilities. Rather, it seemed to ask 
more questions than it answered. The ISA will defer to the LTC to discuss more technical provisions of 
the Draft Regulations. As such, from March 12 to 23, 2018, the LTC of the ISA will be meeting, with Part 
2 of the Session of the ISA to take place in July, 2018. Whether or not additional question will be 
addressed remains to be seen.  
 Given that many nations cannot yet agree on compliance and liability for the Area, it is more 
important that academia provide guidance. Thus, the current state of the law of DSM should be compared 
with other environmental assessment and liability laws in other marine contexts.
118
 To first compare with 




One of the gaps in knowledge is the type of mining that would be conducted on the seabed. One type of 
mining would involve drilling into the seabed, similar to conventional oil drilling onshore. A second type 
of mining would be a marine equivalent to “open pit” mining – that is, the extraction of minerals over a 
wide area of the sea floor.
119
 As noted in Case 17, the type of mining will change the nature of due 
diligence obligations, and even strict liability and damage claims may be altered. Thus, the Draft 
Regulations need to address each type of mining with specific EA provisions, as the exploration 
regulations have done.  
A second gap in knowledge is scientific uncertainty, as the majority of the seafloor is 
unexplored.
120
 Any extraction or even exploration could have a material negative impact on unknown 
biota to the unknown extent, duration, and toxicity of plumes.
121
 If the scientific community does not yet 
know what types of living species are on the DSB, it is unclear as to how standards of conduct can be 
drafted to deal with the types of harm that could occur. A precautionary approach and even a moratorium 
on drilling would be for scientific advances to take place and provide for more evidence.  
                                                 
113
 ISA, 1st Part of the 24th Session of the International Seabed Authority 5–9 March 2018, Headquarters of the 
International Seabed Authority, Kingston, Jamaica Day 1 (ISA 24th Session, Day 1).  
114
 Earth Negotiations Bulletin, “Summary of the Twenty Fourth Annual session of the International Seabed 
Authority (First Part),” Press Release (9 March 2018) 25:157.  
115
 OceansLaw, “Rule of Law Committee for the Oceans, LOS News – 6 March 2018: the ISA and Seabed Mining 
Code – Day 1 Report,” (6 March 2018) Oceanlaw.org.  
116
 ISA 24th Session, n. 113 above, Day 3 report. 
117
 Id., Day 3 Report. 
118
 They should also be compared with onshore extractive industries; however, this is beyond the scope of this 
article.  
119
 KA. Miller et al., “An overview of seabed mining including the current state of development, environmental 
impacts, and knowledge gaps,” Frontiers in Marine Science 4 (2018), online: DOI: 10.3389/fmars.2017.00418.  
120
 Id.  
121
 K. Gjerde, “The ISA’s Biggest Issue of 2018,” Press Release, DSM Observer (4 March 2018), available online: 
<http://dsmobserver.org/2018/03/isas-biggest-issue-2018/>.  
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Many scholars view that on-shore and near off-shore extraction poses more harms than DSM.
122
 
A third unknown is the lack of knowledge on the extent of environmental and compensable damage that 
may occur from DSM. Thus, any negligence or liability claim may not have the sufficient legal grounds 
to warrant a finding of guilt on the contractor or sponsoring state. While Article 139 of the UNCLOS 
creates a liability regime, the Annexes and Draft Regulations speak about a “wrongful act or omission” 
threshold.
123
 There is no strict liability or negligence argument contained in the Draft Regulations.
124
 
Moreover, the Environmental Management Plan does not contain any requirement to have insurance or 
financing in place for any environmental damage.
125
 The Draft Regulations are vague in their assessment 
of liabilities for environmental damage. The issues of remoteness and other legal definitions, such as 
“wrongful acts,” are neither defined nor explained.  
As noted above, and to this end, a strong response to the Draft Regulations came from the 
Australian delegation. Australia submits that it  
 
is of the view that there needs to be more detail regarding the liability of a sponsoring state and 
how it can take responsibility for ensuring exploitation is undertaken in a safe and 
environmentally responsible manner. For example, the liability and enforcement mechanisms in 
the Regulations need to act as an effective deterrent to prevent Contractors from causing 
environmental harm or violating safety regulations. Australia suggests that, in addition to the 
monetary penalties prescribed in Appendix III of the Draft Regulations, consideration should be 
given to the application of monetary penalties for a broader range of breaches of environmental 





The questions addressed in Case 17 are limited in scope and do not provide for a fulsome answer. 
The SDC also notes that one consequence of the exclusion of water evacuation and disposal of material 
from “activities in the Area” would be that the activities conducted by the contractor which are among the 
most hazardous to the environment would be excluded from those to which the responsibilities of the 
sponsoring State apply.
127
 Case 17 did not address liability provisions of the flag State.  
A fourth gap, therefore, includes the roles of the flag State and the vessel State (and potentially 
the processing State) for responsibility and liability. It is the responsibility of the Authority to determine 
both the rate at which exploitation of the Area will be allowed, and the methods in which the proceeds 
from exploitation will be shared among the members of the international community, as well as between 
current and future generations.
128
 African countries could very much, through a subsidiary of a 
transnational corporation, sponsor their way into DSM, as small island states have done.
129
   Developing 
countries often has weak environmental protection legislation.
130
 The lack of domestic DSM legislation in 
                                                 
122
 L.D. Bulong, “Into the abyss: Rationalizing commercial deep seabed mining through pragmatism and 
international law,” Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law  25 (2016): 128–181, p. 175.  
123
 UNCLOS, Article 139, and Draft Regulations , para. 8.2. 
124
 See also Case 17, n. 20 above, para. 179. 
125
 Draft Regulations, n 89 above, Regulation 19. 
126
 Government of Australia, Government of Australia’s submission on the draft Regulations on Exploitation of 
Mineral Resources in the Area, received 20 December 2017, available online: 
<https://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/Regs/2017/MS/Australia.pdf>. A complete list of submissions was 
released. See ISA, Submissions to International Seabed Authority’s Draft Regulations on Exploitation of Mineral 
Resources in the Area (ISBA/23/C/12; ISBA/23/LTC/CRP.3*) (date, 2017) Available online: 
<https://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/Regs/2017/List-1.pdf>.  
127
 Case 17, n. 20 above, para 97. 
128
 1994 Agreement, Annex, Sec. (6). 
129
 Egede, n. 81 above, p. 697. 
130
 Id., p. 698, this statement would apply not only to African states, but any state that lacks capacity or willingness 
to provide for vigorous flag registration requirements. 
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these jurisdictions is problematic, as there is no domestic environmental legislation to backstop a damage 
claim.  But, more importantly, the legislation below creates indemnification provisions for these States. 
How States will be indemnified is still unknown. The most likely source will be in DSM insurance. The 
Interoceanmetal Joint Organisation highlighted this fact in their response to the Draft Regulations, stating:  
 
it should be carefully analyzed because actual suspension of mining operations in the Area, 
taking into account the risks associated, predicted structure of the operational costs and cash 
flow regime may very likely result in the real life in the mining termination with little chances 
for recovering the production and all risks associated are included, including 
environmental….Insurance cost should be recognized for the proper considerations of 
contractor’s economic models ongoing now in the Authority. Probably, common insurance 
conditions valid for all contracts should be proposed in further regulations. It is not clear if there 




 More information and clarification on the role of financing and insurance is required, especially as the 
SDC ruled out residual liability.
132
  
Finally, the issue of which parties can bring claims is still unresolved.
133
 Not only are sponsoring 
states and the ISA potential defendants, they are also potential claimants. In summation, there is still 
much uncertainty over the provision requiring domestic legislation. The References are made to 
Sponsoring States in the working draft, but the lines of duty and responsibility (jurisdictional competence) 
between the Authority and sponsoring States (together with that of flag States, States Parties, and non-
Parties to the Convention and relevant international organizations, including the International Maritime 
Organization) are not entirely clear.
134
 For example, Australia “welcomed references to sponsoring states’ 
national legislation, noting that the system should also help contractors decide which sponsoring state to 
approach.”
135
 Belgium stressed the need for: “a balanced relationship between the ISA and contractors; 
clarity on monitoring rules to avoid “sponsor shopping”; and more attention to environmental 
regulations.”
136
 China on the other hand, “arguing that sponsoring states that have taken necessary and 
appropriate measures should not be held responsible for contractors’ misconduct.”
137
 There is thus serious 





PART 3 – STATE OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION OF DSM  
 
                                                 
131
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132
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133
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134
 Working Paper, Environmental Matters, n. 102 above, para. 4.6. 
135
 Australia Response, n. 126 above.  
136
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Regulations, ISBA/23/C/12; ISBA/23/LTC/CRP.3*. 
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article. The author has made a submission to continue this line of research as part of a Ph.D. application at Dalhousie 
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In Case 17, the SDC described due diligence as a variable concept, meaning that the standard could 
change as technologies improve,
139
 and that there should be a higher standard for riskier activities.
140
 The 
SDC continues to point out that the UNCLOS requires the sponsoring State to adopt “laws and 
regulations” and to take “administrative measures which are, within the framework of its legal system, 
reasonably appropriate for securing compliance by persons under its jurisdiction.”
141
  
Following its discussion of due diligence, the SDC outlined the “direct obligations” of sponsoring 
States under the UNCLOS and general international law.
142
 The ISA invited countries to provide the texts 






 and even the United States have submitted their 
legislation.
146
 Canada has not.
147
 Tonga, in 2017, had a population of just over 110,000 people.
148
 Nauru 
had a population of 13,049.
149
 The question must be asked: How can these two small countries possibility 
have the legal systems in place to meet their due diligence requirements? A representative sample of 
several countries will be canvassed, though it is beyond the scope of this article to review every country 
that would have an interest in DSM in the Area.  
 
Nauru and Tonga 
 
The Nauru legislation is illustrative, stating that the “Sponsored Party shall be responsible for the 
performance of all Seabed Mineral Activities carried out within the Contract Area, and their compliance 
with the Rules of the ISA, and shall be liable for the actual amount of any compensation, damage or 
penalties arising out of its failure so to comply, or out of any wrongful acts or omissions [emphasis 
added] in the conduct of the Seabed Mineral Activities.”
150
 Section 29(2) provides indemnification for 
Nauru for all actions, proceedings, costs, charges, claims, and demands which may be made or brought by 
any third party in relation to a Sponsored Party’s Seabed Mineral Activities.
151
 Furthermore, section 46 
gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction to establish liability and to provide recourse for prompt and 
adequate compensation in the event of unlawful damage caused by Seabed Mineral Activities, in 
accordance with article 235(2) of the UNCLOS.
152
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 Tanaka, n. 26 above, p. 210.  
140
 Case 17, n. 20 above, para. 110. 
141
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142
 Anton, n. 34 above, p. 248. 
143
 ISA, Decision of the Council of the International Seabed Authority  (21 July 2011) ISBA/17/C/20, para. 3. 
144
 Republic of Nauru, International Seabed Minerals Act, No. 26 of 2015.  
145
 Tonga, Seabed Minerals Act, 2014, Act 10 of 2014. 
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 These include: Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 1980  Public Law 96-283, 28 June 1980, 94 Stat. 553 
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Exploration Licenses 1980 46 Fed. Reg. 45896 (15 September 1981); 15 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 970; 
Deep Seabed Mining Regulations for Commercial Recovery Permits  54 Fed. Reg. 525 (6 January 1989); 15 Code of 
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103-426, enacted 31 October 1994; 108 Stat. 4371) OCS Report. MMS 99-0070 (December 1999); In future 
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148
 CIA World Fact Book, Tonga, People and Society, (est. July 2017), available online: 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tn.html>.  
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 United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision: Nauru  (United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. Retrieved 10 September 2017). 
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 Nauru, Act, s. 29(1). 
151
 Id., s. 29(2). 
152
 Id., s. 46. 
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For Tonga, section 70 and section 84 of the Tonga legislation
153
 are similar in wording to 
Nauru’s. Section 70(3) provides the indemnification for Tonga, while the Licensee is liable for the actual 
amount of any compensation or damage arising out of its failure to comply with this Act, Regulations 
made under this Act, or the Licence, and any “wrongful acts or omissions”  [emphasis added] and those of 
its employees, officers, subcontractors, and agents in the conduct of the Seabed Mineral Activities or 
Ancillary Operations under Licence, including but not limited to that arising from injury to coastal or 
marine users, damage to the Marine Environment, and any related economic loss or compensation.
154
 
Section 70(4) provides for joint and several liabilities,
155
 while section 70(5) provides for the continuation 
of liabilities even after all activities have ceased.
156
  
Case 17 highlighted the need to use the precautionary approach to due diligence.
157
 However, 
both provisions in Tonga and Nauru seem to absolve themselves from this due diligence requirement. The 
use of “wrongful acts and omissions” is problematic, as a strict liability regime would not concern 
whether an act is wrongful or not to warrant a liability claim. This does not seem to be a legislative 
oversight, as section 109 of the Tonga legislation relates to non-interference with freedom of the high 
seas.
158
 Section 109(5), creates a “strict liability” offence.
159
 If section 109(4) specifically and explicitly 
creates a strict liability offence, yet sections 70 and 84 create a “wrongful act” liability standard, then this 
would preclude it from being strict liability. Finally, issues to be addressed in subsequent research include 





Singapore has enacted DSM legislation. In 2013, Singapore sponsored an application from a company 
domiciled in the country.
160
 The Deep Seabed Mining Act 2015
161
 governs Singapore’s domestic DSM 
legislation. Singapore directly quotes the need for due diligence per section 7(1) of the legislation when it 
states that, before it will grant a license, the Minister must be satisfied that the company meets, or is likely 
to meet, the qualification standards under Annex III, Article 4 of the UNCLOS.
162
 Moreover, the nation 
requires a company to post security for the due performance of its obligations.
163
 Unfortunately, 
Singapore also requires an execution by the licensee to indemnify the nation against any liability 
incurred;
164
 however, any breaches are only subject to a fine.
165
 
 In contemplation of avoiding liabilities by using a corporate form, section 12(6) states that any 
transfer of license does not affect any criminal or civil liability from the original licensee.
166
 Section 16 
provides for the government to order specific performance to prevent, contain, or minimize any harmful 
environmental effects.
167
 Finally, section 17 provides domestic enforcement of Annex III judgements.
168
 
                                                 
153
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From an enforcement perspective, section 18 allows for SDC orders to be registered in Singapore, but a 
state may still claim privilege or immunity.
169
 However, the issue of strict liability for operators may not 
be accurate, as section 21 of the legislation requires, for an offense, to prove consent or connivance of an 






Given Canada’s role in DSM, its familiarity with mining, offshore oil and gas, and its extension of its 
continental shelf claims beyond the 200-nautical mile limits,
171
 it is somewhat surprising that the nation 
has not developed domestic legislation for DSM in the Area.
172
 While Canada does not have fulsome 
legislation, there is evidence from regulation. The Endeavour Hydrothermal Vents Marine Protected Area 
Regulations state: 
 
s. 2 No person shall 
(a) disturb, damage or destroy, in the Area, or remove from the Area, any part of the seabed, 
including a venting structure, or any part of the subsoil, or any living marine organism or any 
part of its habitat; or 
(b) carry out any underwater activity in the Area that is likely to result in the disturbance, 




This is a very strict obligation and one that could pose the question that the ISA has DSM regulation all 
wrong. There is an argument for goal-based regulation as used in international shipping, which will be 
discussed below. It also shows a potentially conflicting opinion between developed and developing 




The UK legislation for DSM is the Deep Sea Mining Act, 2014 (“UK 2014 Act”).
174
 This legislation 
updates the previous legislation, the Deep Sea Mining (Temporary Provisions) Act 1981 (Temporary 
Act).
175
 The UK has significant investments in the CCZ through the UK Seabed Resourced Ltd.
176
 Like 
Singapore, the UK expressly allows for enforcement of the SDC to be taken in the UK High Court, 
including arbitration awards.
177
 Intriguingly, section 10 of the UK 2014 Act expressly omits section 10 of 
the Temporary Act, which had created a Deep Sea Mining Fund. The liability provisions solely deal with 
personal injury, not environmental damage.
178
 The only environmental protection stems from section 5 of 
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On a positive note, there is no indemnification provision in the legislation, so the UK has not 
absolved itself of liability. However, the remaining sections are weak on environmental protections.  The 
legislation seems to delegate to the ISA and the UNCLOS, all other claims for damage. This does not 




The final domestic jurisdiction to be canvassed is China.
180
 Its approach is based upon their 2016 
legislation.
181
 China is a major player in DSM exploration, with over four exploration contracts with the 
ISA,
 182
 two of which are with State-owned enterprises.
183
 China’s legislation appears to be more 
complete than other nations explored, with seven chapters and 29 articles. Environmental pollution and 
damage to cultural relics is contained in Articles 9(3), 11, and 12. Fines for pollution/damage can range 
from CNY500,000 to 1,000,000, and if the illegal activities constitute a crime, criminal responsibility 
entails.
184
 The legislation itself provides for “reasonably appropriate” environmental protections, and one 
notable area omitted is in Environmental Assessments.
185
  Other fiscal arrangements are omitted, and as 
Xu notes “before exploitation activities commence, fiscal issues should be in place”.
186
 It is unclear 
whether the above penalties provide limits to liabilities by the operator, although the potential for criminal 
charges is a novel approach. Foreign investment is omitted from the legislation.
187
 This would impact the 
effectiveness of the common heritage of mankind doctrine, as well as the practicalities of the size and 
scope of DSM operations.  
In this summary canvass of domestic legislation, there is a broad range of theoretical approaches, 
and all have significant flaws and omissions. Tonga and Nauru seem to alter the strict liability to a 
“wrongful act” regime, and limit their own liabilities, in contrast to Case 17. The UK takes a “hands-off” 
approach, which seems to leave to the international system to fill in the gaps. Unfortunately, if the 
international system has gaps, then there is nothing to fill in. Finally, China’s legislation seems to cap 
liabilities,
188
 so it may not compensate for the environmental harms caused. However, some evidence 
from their approach to oil spills may provide clarity. 
 
 
PART 4 – LESSONS FROM OTHER INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 
                                                 
179
 Id., s. 5 
180
 Unfortunately, the links to the actual texts are in Mandarin/Chinese. As such, the article will use third party peer 
reviewed articles for its analysis.  
181
 Deep Seabed Area Resource Exploration and Exploitation Law of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter 
“Deep Seabed Law”) promulgated 26 Feb. 2016, entered into force 1 May 2016, adopted at the 19th Session of the 
Standing Committee of the 12th National People’s Congress (NPC) of China, Order No. 42 of the President of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC).  
182
 G. Zhang and P. Zheng, “A new step forward: Review of China’s 2016 legislation on international seabed area 
exploration and exploitation,” Marine Policy 73 (2016): 244–255, p. 246. 
183
 X. Xu, G. Zhang and G.J. Xue, “China’s deep seabed law: Towards “reasonably appropriate” environmental 
legislation for exploration and exploitation of deep sea minerals in the Area,” Asian Yearbook of International Law 
21 (2015), available online: <https://brill.com/abstract/book/edcoll/9789004344556/B978-90-04-34454-
9_012.xml>.  
184
 Zhang and Zheng, n. 182 above, p. 250. 
185
 Xu et al., n. 183 above; Of note, a lack of EA was also at issue in the Philippines -China dispute below. Whether 




 Zhang and Zheng, n. 182 above, p. 251. 
188
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Civil Liability Regimes 
 
There are several relevant international conventions that deal with liability for damage to the marine 
environment. The Protocol to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage (CLC) provides for strict liability on the part of the registered owner of the tanker to pay 
compensation for “pollution damage.”
189
 The CLC explicitly uses the term “negligence.”
190
 It also raised 
the limits of liability, established a compulsory insurance requirement, and introduced the possibility of a 
direct action against the insurer.
191
 Norway would appear to be the only state that has extended its 
application of the CLC (as implemented nationally) to oil pollution on the high seas; that action benefits 
both the environment and the polluting ship-owner.
192
  
 The International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds are a key component of this strict liability 
regime. Claims from the Torrey Canyon spill, to which compensation was only available via international 
maritime law, required a claim of negligence and gave the ship-owner the right to limit liability to 
amounts deemed insufficient.
193
 The Fund created a levy system and explicitly covers compensation for 
reasonable measures to reinstate an environment to its pre-contaminated state.
194
  
 In this regard, China’s updated legislation is illustrative. Section 66 of the Marine Environmental 
Protection Law, 1999
195
 created the compensation fund for vessel oil pollution, and the 2010 regulations 
increased liability limits and made insurance mandatory.
196
 This fund is a key and critical component of 
environment protections, as it applies when the damage exceeds the operator’s liability and/or ability to 
pay, when the operator is exempted from liability, and when the source of pollution cannot be 
ascertained.
197
 Compensation for vessel source oil pollution plays an essential role in protecting the 
interests of victims and in the prevention of oil pollution.
198
 This is a glaring flaw in the DSM regime.  
 The International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, 2001
199
 was 
adopted to ensure that adequate, prompt, and effective compensation is available to persons who suffer 
damage caused by spills of oil, when the oil is carried as fuel in ships’ bunkers.
200
 This convention applies 
to damage caused to the territory, including the territorial sea, and in exclusive economic zones of States 
Parties.
201
 Another key provision is the requirement for direct action. This would allow a claim for 
compensation for pollution damage to be brought directly against an insurer.
202
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 The not-yet in force 2010 Hazardous and Noxious Substances Convention
203
 (HNS) sets out a 
shared liability regime to compensate claimants for damages arising from the international or domestic 
carriage of HNS by seagoing vessels.
204
 It has both ship-owners liability and an HNS Fund provision.
205
 
The ship-owners liability is a strict liability regime, while the HNS liability is either a negligence standard 
or, if the ship-owner cannot pay, a strict liability standard.
206
  
This convention would greatly expand liability, compared to Canadian domestic legislation, from 
a maximum of CA$16 million to CA$74 million (for a 20,000 tonne ship) and a total maximum liability 
of CA$500 million.
207
 This is another example of how domestic legislation may be insufficient to cover 
the harms to the environment. However, the Canadian approach has a wider scope than the international 
regime and pays on claims having to do with both persistent oil and non-persistent oil pollution 
discharged from all classes of ships.
208
 
The main takeaway is that various international agreements provide for strict liability for 
environmental damage. The evidence seems to indicate that the number of oil spills and the amount of oil 
that has been discharged has declined over the last number of years.
209
 Yet, the phrasing of the Draft 
Regulations and domestic legislation seems to provide for a “wrong act or omission” standard.   
The United States is the most significant maritime nation that has chosen not to be a party to the 
UNCLOS and instead has developed its own national law concerning liability for oil pollution 
damages.
210
 In the United States, the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill demonstrated the consequences of a 
major environmental disaster in the marine environment.
211
 The case illustrated domestic liability 
legislation and certain issues with the concept of “pure economic loss.”
212
  
The United States imposes a strict liability without fault on all responsible parties for oil 
discharges.
213
 Responsible parties include the owner, operator, or charterer of a vessel, the owner or 
operator of an onshore oil facility; the lessee, permittee, and owner and operator of any offshore facility; 
the owner and operator of a pipeline; and the licensee of a deep-water port.
214
 Furthermore, the United 
States has created an Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.
215
  
The United States is not a party to the UNCLOS, so it will be interesting to note their DSM 
activities, and their liabilities for environmental damage should be involved as either a vessel State, a flag 
State, or a port/processing State. However, it is this type of legislation that is required; strict and 
unlimited liability for all parties, with an environmental liability fund if damages are larger than one party 
can or will pay.
216
 
In summation, the civil liability regimes provide great evidence as to the correct approach for 
DSM liability. The regulations are clear, provide for strict liability for operators, and no indemnification 
                                                 
203
 International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of 
Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, 2010 (HNS Convention). 
204
 Transport Canada, Maritime Transport of Hazardous and Noxious Substances: Liability and Compensation 
Discussion Paper (October 2010) (Ottawa: Transport Canada, 2010).  
205
 HNS Convention, n.  203 above, Part II, Article 7. 
206
 Transport Canada, n. 200204 above, p. 8. 
207
 Id., p. 13 
208
 Zhu et al., n. 195 above, p. 277. 
209
 C. Kontovas, H. Psaraftis and N. Ventikos, “An empirical analysis of IOPCF oil spill cost data,” Marine 
Pollution Bulletin 60 (2010): 1455–1466, p. 1456. 
210
 T.J. Schoenbaum, “Liability for damages in oil spill accidents: Evaluating the USA and international law regimes 
in the light of Deepwater Horizon,” Journal of Environmental Law 24, no. 3 (2012): 395–416, p. 397. 
211
 A. Davis , “Pure economic loss claims under the Oil Pollution Act: Combining policy and congressional intent,” 
Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems 45, no. 1 (2011): 1-44  
212
 Id., p. 3. 
213
 33 USC ss. 2701 and 2702, see also Schoenbaum, n. 210above, p. 398.  
214
 Id., s. 2701. 
215
 Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, 25 USC s. 9509; See also 46 USC s. 4611. 
216
 The U.S. has DSM legislation.  See n 146 above. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3297577
20 
 
for State parties. Furthermore, the technology fund provides for the extra bit of “insurance” to ensure that 




Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Provisions  
 
As noted in Part 1, the Solwara 1 in PNG’s EEZ could be highly comparative to DSM in the Area. 
Unfortunately, PNG does not have any laws on DSM in the EEZ that would regulate Solwara 1.
218
 Thus, 
both PNG and Nautilus may work with “environmental impunity.”
219
 While a limited amount of onshore 
processing will occur in PNG, the majority of processing will occur in China.
220
 One potential saving 
grace is, as previously noted, that Nautilus is a Canadian company and listed under the TSX. The 
provincial securities acts, for example in British Columbia,
221
 and the TSX require certain mandatory 
disclosures and risk assessments, and investors should be cognizant of potential company liabilities.
222
 At 
the date of writing, the project is showing significant financial hurdles. In December, 2017, a citizens 
group, represented by the Centre for Environmental Law and Community Rights Inc. (Celcor) and 
assisted by the New South Wales Environmental Defenders Office commenced a lawsuit against PNG 
claiming insufficient EA procedures for the project.
223
 There is thus significant uncertainty about if this 
project will begin.  
New Zealand has a novel approach to DSM, at least within its EEZ. Their legislation, The 
Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act (Environmental Effects) 2012  (“NZ Act”),
224
 
provides that non-discharge offenses are subject to strict liability.
225
 DSM in the EEZ was considered in 
the Trans-Tasman Resources Ltd. Marine Consent Decision,
226
 and highlighted the uncertainty of the 
determination of costs of potentially adverse effects.
227
 In the face of this uncertainty, the use of the 
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precautionary approach is mandated, but even this approach has “no easy answers.”
228
 The license was 
granted, but it is currently under appeal.
229
 
The Trans-Tasman case may have implications for DSM in the Area, as adequate information on 
the effects on the environment, monitoring baseline data, and adaptive management approaches are 
required.
230
 This could all have implications on the due diligence requirement from Case 17. There is 
another interesting issue with liability – the ability to collect. According to Makgill, “in practical terms, 
the ability to recover damages is likely to be governed by the financial resources available to those 
liable.”
231
 As a valid example, Nautilus is having significant financial obstacles, and without an 
environmental trust fund or significant insurance policies in place, it is unlikely that any environmental 
damage claim, even if awarded, could be collected. The ISA needs to take action.  
 
Flag State Liabilities 
 
Many boundary questions remain, including the line between flag State and sponsoring State liability.
232
 
Flag State liabilities arise from Articles 209(2), 211 and Article 217 of the UNCLOS. Article 209(2) 
states that flag States shall adopt laws to prevent, reduce, and control pollution from vessels flying under 
their flag.
233
 States shall ensure compliance of vessels flying under their flag.
234
 However, there is a lack 
of full clarity to their application to DSM in the Area and on the standard of liability and amount of 
damages that a flag State could face, should environmental damage occur due to DSM. Thus, 
international law precedent on liabilities of flag States and on operators from other settings would prove 
useful in the DSM context.  
On April 2, 2015, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea rendered an advisory opinion 
on the rights and obligations of flag States and coastal States regarding illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated (“IUU”) fishing within the EEZ (Case 21).
235
 Ownership of fishing vessels also comprises a 
“complex structure of nominated front companies and/or non-disclosed beneficial owners.”
236
 The 
tribunal noted that flag States have a “due diligence” obligation to ensure that vessels sailing under their 
flag take the necessary measures to comply with the protection and preservation measures adopted by 
member states.
237
 The State must also have domestic legislation to enforce these rules.
238
  
More importantly, the Tribunal in Case 21 relied heavily on Case 17 to advance its 
jurisprudence.
239
 Like Case 17, the standard of liability for flag States arises not out of the actions of the 
operator, but in the failure to comply with its due diligence obligation.
240
 The Tribunal noted: 
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Although the relationship between sponsoring States and contractors is not entirely 
comparable to that existing between the flag State and vessels flying its flag which are 
engaged in fishing activities in the exclusive economic zone of the coastal State, the Tribunal 
holds the view that the clarifications provided by the Seabed Disputes Chamber regarding 
the meaning of the expression “responsibility to ensure” and the interrelationship between 
the notions of obligations “of due diligence” and obligations “of conduct” referred to in 




Thus, flag State liabilities are the same as sponsoring State liabilities, in that it is their responsibility to 
ensure to deploy the adequate means and exercise best possible efforts to obtain this result.
242
 The liability 
of the flag State arises from a failure to comply with its “due diligence” obligations.
243
 
The issue of flag State liability also arose in the China-Philippines dispute.
244
 The tribunal stated 
that anything less than a due diligence standard by the flag State to avoid IUU would fall short of the 
UNCLOS.
245
 Moreover, as there is such a close link between Chinese fishing vessels and the Chinese 
government, there is a heightened obligation on the part of the flag State.
246
  
This case is relevant to DSM due to the marine environmental protection obligations of flag 
States. The obligations noted in China-Philippines apply to flag States regardless of the location of the 
harmful activities; thus, jurisdiction is not dependent on sovereignty or the existence of an EEZ.
247
 It also 
displays the extent of how an EA would fulfill a due diligence defense. The Draft Regulations provide for 
a need for an EA to be granted a license to conduct DSM in the area. Case 17 specifically noted that due 
diligence requirements will differ based on the type of mining. China-Philippines could provide evidence 
as to the extent of the requirements, specifically with the use of EA. China-Philippines noted that the 
existence (or lack thereof) of an EA is important, but it is not definitive in determining whether there is a 
breach of its requirements under Article 206.
248
 Moreover, China’s DSM firms are state-controlled 
operations, and thus the flag State, sponsoring State, and operator all may be deemed the same and have 
higher obligations for liability.
249
 EAs should assist in meeting a due diligence threshold, but by 
themselves they may not absolve a flag State from liability. 
 
  
PART 5 – ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Much more work needs to be conducted to ensure that fulsome liability provisions are in place for DSM 
in the Area. The liability regime should reflect a transnationalist approach with a stewardship doctrine. 
Thus, the use of the Precautionary Principle makes abundant sense, especially because of scientific 
uncertainty. When taken in context with the Sustainable Development Goals and the “common heritage of 
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mankind,” this makes an even more compelling argument. According to the Sustainable Development 






Operator liability seems to depend on the definition of a “wrongful act or omission,” the language used in 
the UNCLOS and the Draft Regulations. Case 17 highlighted the need for different due diligence 
standards for different types of mining. This may have inadvertently tipped the hand that the strict 
liability will not be enforced, even for contractor/operators. This regime seems to lead back to the general 
international maritime law surrounding environmental damage.  
To answer, some evidence is provided by the Draft articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (Draft Articles).
251
 While not in force, and applicable to state parties, these 
Draft Articles may assist in articulating the elements of the offense. Article 2 states that there is an 
internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) is 
attributable to the State under international law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation 
of the State.
252
 Unfortunately, the accompanying commentaries determine that the interpretation of a 
breach may be subjective (i.e., with intent or knowledge) or objective (i.e. inadvertence or negligence).
253
  
Thus, the offense may be both intentional and negligent. Either definition seems to preclude strict 
liability. If negligence is the standard, then there is also a due diligence defense. And, as Case 17 noted, 
due diligence may depend on the quality of the Environmental Assessments (EA) conducted. 
Environmental Assessments (also known as Environmental Impact Assessments) are used to 
anticipate, assess, and reduce environmental and social risks from a project.
254
 The ISA requires an EA 
for the Area,
255
 but it is not a robust regime.
256
 There are several accepted criteria for a fulsome EA 
process. This process includes screening, scoping, EA, environmental management plans, external 
reviews by experts, public stakeholder consultations, and regulatory reviews.
257
 EA standards may also 
limit liability based on the Draft Regulations. If the Operator has an EA approved by the ISA, but 
environmental damage occurs, then it is unclear whether the operator will be liable, absent a “wrongful 
act or omission.”  
The Environmental liability and common heritage may be at odds.  
 
Even where adherence to international rules is demonstrated, there would remain potential for 
inconsistent interpretation and application of those rules that may need to be resolved. As a 
consequence, there will be a need for both vertical (Authority – sponsoring state) and horizontal 
(between sponsoring states) harmonization of EA processes and related compliance action to 




                                                 
250
 UNGA, Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Sustainable Development 
Goals, (21 October 2015) A/RES/70/1, Goal 14: Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources   
251
 International Law Commission, Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts , 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission  2:2  (2001) (A/56/10)  
252
 Id., Article 2. 
253
 Id., Commentary to Article 2, subsection (2), p. 34.  
254
 J.M. Durden et al., “Environmental impact assessment process for deep-sea mining in ‘the Area’,” Marine Policy 
87 (2018): 194–202. 
255
 Draft Regulations, n 89 above, Regulations 18, 19, 20 
256
 J.M. Durden et al., “A procedural framework for robust environmental management of deep -sea mining projects 
using a conceptual model,” Marine Policy 84 (2017): 193–201. 
257
 Durden et al., n. 254 above, p. 196. 
258
 N. Craik, ISA Discussion Paper No 4, Enforcement and Liability Challenges in the Regulation of Deep Seabed 
Mining (Jamaica, ISA, 2016), p. 10. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3297577
24 
 
The ability to pay is also very much in question. Interoceanmetal’s casual observation is relevant. 
They stated that the insurance industry may not be ready to make a policy. Moreover, as will be detailed 
in a follow-up research paper, it is difficult to conceive of how such a policy would take place, given the 
unknown liability, amount of damage, limit on liability, indemnification of sponsoring States, and other 
factors. As a matter of international law, it seems that every State has the right to combat pollution on the 
high seas, but no existing legal regime appears to provide for compensation. The ISA needs to clarify 
liabilities of operators, create a levy system to create a fund, and assist the insurance industry to create  
DSM policies. In other words, the international community, through the civil liability regimes discussed 
above, have created a mutually beneficial solution that benefits both the environment and the business 
community. The ISA should follow this solution for DSM. Unfortunately, through domestic legislation, 




Case 17 is the representative precedent for sponsoring State liability. It is also clear that there should be 
no distinction of liability for developing or developed States.
259
 To use a somewhat colloquial 
comparison, “with great power comes great responsibility.”
260
 Countries want to harvest and exploit the 
minerals on the DSB, but in terms of the Area, they do not want to have any liabilities and have legislated 
indemnifications for any liability that is due. This seems inherently contradictory to Case 17 and the due 
diligence defense, and the protection of the environment. The watering down from a State needing to take 
all steps necessary to only reasonable steps necessary shows a weakening of environmental protections.   
Domestic legislation does not assist in the matter and may further weaken environmental 
protections. Nauru and Tonga seem to completely absolve themselves of any liability. The UK takes a 
hands-off approach, seemingly leaving it to the ISA. The United States takes a strict liability approach, at 
least with EEZ and oil spill legislation. New Zealand takes a very precautionary approach, both with EEZ 
and in the Area. Singapore takes a middle ground. Belgium may have a point – there is a real potential of 
sponsors shopping to avoid liability. This contradicts the necessity of sections 209 and 235 of the 
UNCLOS, requiring domestic legislation and enforcing compensation claims.  
The biggest unknown still is in compensation claims if operators cannot or will not pay. The 
indemnification clauses, pragmatically, are only relevant if the operator has the financial means. A 
compulsory insurance regime and a levy based environmental fund would solve many of these issues. 
Plakokefalos notes “it remains to be seen how the Opinion will play out in the unfortunate case where 






While there are similarities between flag States and sponsoring States, there are significant differences.
262
 
The Solwara 1 case is again illustrative. Nautilus does not own the ship but is chartering the ship from 
Dubai. UNCLOS section 91(1) states that there must be a genuine connection to register a vessel. 
Moreover, the flag State must exercise effective jurisdiction over the vessel.
263
 Cases 17, 21, and the 
China-Philippines Arbitration seem to indicate that a flag State also may be liable if they fail in their 
obligations to oversee the vessel. The due diligence defense seems to be the same as those of the 
                                                 
259
 Oyarce, n. 160 above, p. 3. 
260
 W. Lamb, “Habeas Corpus Suspension Bill,” The Parliamentary Debates from the Year 1803 to the Present 
Time, Volume 36, Comprising the Period from the Twenty-Eight Day of April to the Twelfth Day of July, 1817, (27 
June 1817) Start Column Number 1225, Quote Column Number 1226 and 1227, Published Under the 
Superintendence of T.C. Hansard, Fleet Street, London. 
261
 Plakokefalos , n. 28 above, p. 136. 
262
 Oyarce, n. 160 above, p. 3. 
263
 UNCLOS, n. 1 above, s. 94. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3297577
25 
 
sponsoring state. However, there is no domestic legislation specifically required for flag States as it 
relates to DSM in the Area. Dubai/the UAE, for instance, does not have DSM legislation.  
 As Case 17 noted, due diligence depends on the type of mining. The requirements of EA may 
provide evidence of meeting this obligation. But, given China’s omission of EA in their domestic 
legislation and given the response of the tribunal in PCA, they could breach the requirements of Articles 
209 and thus not meet their liability requirements. The ISA needs to create specific EA standards for each 
type of mining and clarify how they differ in order for sponsoring and flag States to meet their 
obligations.  
 
International Seabed Authority 
 
The ISA is a party to potential DSM environmental claims and thus could be liable. The “wrongful act” 
provides the requisite standard, and it seems to have the due diligence defense as per Case 17. Case 21 
also noted liability of an international organization.
264
 In Case 21, it was the organization that granted 
fishing licenses. This would be akin and comparable to the ISA, which grants exploration and exploitation 
licenses. The indemnification clause in section 8.2 of the Draft Regulations, however, weakens this 
standard, without creating a mechanism by which operators may actually have the financial capabilities of 
indemnifying the other parties.  
The ISA states that it is in agreement with environmental protections and the precautionary 
approach, at least in theory. The ISA has reaffirmed its position on the environment in its strategic plan.
265
 
Unfortunately, these positions do not specifically state that they will ensure the effective cleanup and 
remediation of any environmental damage, should it occur, nor ensure that there are funds available to 





The evidence all indicates that there are still too many unknowns to proceed with exploitation of DSM in 
the Area without further developing the legal obligations of all parties. The ISA is in a powerful position 
to grant licenses. It needs to take a step back, develop much more robust regulations to prevent 
environmental damage, and ensure that remediation of the environment can take place if environmental 
damage occurs. Currently, there is no mechanism for this assurance.  
There is a real concern that the Draft Regulations will be watered down due to certain Asian and 
developing countries’ concerns, as shown by the responses in the 24th Session of the ISA. With the ISA 
aiming for a July, 2018, release of the next round of Draft Regulations, in time for Part 2 of the 24th 
session of the ISA on July 24, 2018 there does not appear to be enough time or appetite to make the 
regulations more stringent. The lack of an environmental fund is the most glaring omission. This is an 
oversight and potentially hazardous outcomes may result.  
On November 15, 2017, the UN General Assembly Resolution A/72/L.7 convened a conference 
for 2018, 2019, and 2020 to discuss the implementation of a binding agreement on the conservation and 
sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction.
266
 This would include 
the Area and would have repercussions for DSM. The ISA needs to take the outcomes of this conference 
and ensure that that protection of the marine environment in the Area is protected.  
                                                 
264
 Case 21, n. 235 above, para. 156. 
265
 ISA, Draft Strategic Plan V2.1, (26 February 2018) at SD3 (Jamaica, ISA) available online: 
<https://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/SPlan/SP-en.pdf>.  
266
 UN General Assembly, A/72/L.7 Seventy second session, Agenda no 77, 15 November 2017, International 
legally binding instrument under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and 
sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3297577
26 
 
It seems like “the tail is wagging the dog,” in that the technology seems to be determining the 
law, rather than the law determining the liability.
267
 Clearly, the international community can do better. 
The civil liability regimes provide such evidence. DSM is potentially destructive to the environment and 
much more work is required. The current liability regime is too weak and too unknown to provide a 
framework for such a large-scale industry.  
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